Überwachung

Vorratsdatenspeicherung: Die EU-Staaten missachten das höchste Gericht

Vorratsdatenspeicherung und Grundrechte in Einklang zu bringen, gleicht der Quadratur des Kreises. Die Justiz- und Innenminister der EU-Staaten überlegen, wie sie die Überwachungsmaßnahme mit Gerichtsurteilen vereinbaren könnten. Das gelingt ihnen nicht, wie ein Dokument zeigt, das wir veröffentlichen.

Ministerinnen und Minister für Justiz und für Inneres aller EU-Mitgliedstaaten.
Will Vorratsdatenspeicherung: EU-Rat für Justiz und Inneres. CC-BY 2.0 Bulgarische Ratspräsidentschaft

Die anlasslose Speicherung der Verbindungsdaten sämtlicher Telekommunikation in Europa ist grund- und menschenrechtswidrig. Das hat der Europäische Gerichtshof in gleich zwei Urteilen 2014 und 2016 festgestellt. Auch das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat die deutsche Vorratsdatenspeicherung gestoppt und aufgehoben.


netzpolitik.org - unabhängig & kritisch dank Euch.

Trotz dieser höchstrichterlichen Urteile werden Befürworter der anlasslosen Massenüberwachung nicht müde, die Wiedereinführung der vermeintlichen Allzweckwaffe zu fordern. Auf EU-Ebene versuchen die Mitgliedstaaten, die Vorratsdatenspeicherung irgendwie rechtsstaatlich zu machen. Dabei ist ihr Hauptziel, die „Verfügbarkeit von Daten“ zu gewährleisten – diesen Wunsch in Einklang mit den Vorgaben zu bringen, ist nur Mittel zum Zweck.

Wie schwierig bis unmöglich dieses Vorhaben ist, zeigt ein internes Papier der österreichischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, das am Freitag im Rat für Justiz und Inneres in Brüssel diskutiert wird. Wir veröffentlichen das Dokument als PDF und in Volltext. (Update 07.12.: Jetzt auch auf Deutsch.)

Speicherung „auf das absolut Notwendige beschränkt“

Die Gerichte haben wiederholt klargestellt, dass schon die Speicherung der Daten ein Grundrechtseingriff ist, der ein „diffus bedrohliches Gefühl des Beobachtetseins“ hervorrufen und „eine unbefangene Wahrnehmung der Grundrechte in vielen Bereichen beeinträchtigen kann“. Deshalb muss jede Datenspeicherung „auf das absolut Notwendige beschränkt“ sein, und zwar in Bezug auf betroffene Personen, Kommunikationsmittel, Datenarten und Speicherdauer.

Wenig überraschend kommen auch die Justiz- und Innenministerien zum Ergebnis, dass eine solche Begrenzung „schwierig, wenn nicht gar unmöglich wäre“. Wir hätten einen Vorschlag: nur Daten von Personen speichern, die sich einer Straftat verdächtig machen – und eben nicht anlasslos von der gesamten Bevölkerung.

Besonders perfide behaupten die Ministerien, dass man Datenkategorien nicht begrenzen könne, da sie in Standardisierungsverfahren „speziell für Strafverfolgungszwecke entwickelt wurden“. Auf Deutsch: Die Gesetzgeber will nicht weniger Daten speichern lassen, weil die Polizeibehörden ja bereits eine Liste geliefert haben – auch wenn die illegal ist.

„Kann kein Datenspeicherungssystem rechtfertigen“

Begründet wird die Vorratsdatenspeicherung immer mit internationalem Terrorismus. Tatsächlich genutzt wird sie aber bei allen möglichen Straftaten, das müssen noch nicht mal schwere Straftaten sein. Und die Definition von Straftat ist innerhalb der EU-Staaten keineswegs einheitlich. Dabei schreiben die Gerichte vor, dass Datenspeicherungen nur zur Verfolgung hinreichend schwerer Straftaten gerechtfertigt werden können.

Die Innen- und Justizministerien erkennen an, dass ein allgemeines Interesse an der Bekämpfung schwerer Kriminalität „jedoch nicht ein allgemeines und unterschiedsloses Datenspeicherungssystem rechtfertigen“ kann. Aber statt eine politische Antwort zu geben, wie Strafverfolger auch ohne Massenüberwachung arbeiten können, schieben sie die Verantwortung auf Gerichte, die Verhältnismäßigkeit und Notwendigkeit „in jedem Einzelfall“ definieren sollen.

Begrenzung auf „in Straftat verwickelten Personenkreis“

Der EuGH kritisiert explizit, dass eine Vorratsdatenspeicherung auch Personen betrifft, „bei denen keinerlei Anhaltspunkt dafür besteht, dass ihr Verhalten in einem auch nur mittelbaren oder entfernten Zusammenhang mit schweren Straftaten stehen könnte“.

Die Gerichte schreiben vor, dass jede Datenspeicherung begrenzt sein muss „auf die Daten eines bestimmten Zeitraums und/oder eines bestimmten geografischen Gebiets und/oder eines bestimmten Personenkreises, der in irgendeiner Weise in eine schwere Straftat verwickelt sein könnte“.

Diese Fundamentalkritik am Charakter der anlasslosen Speicherung aller Menschen in Europa ignorieren die Ministerien. „Die meisten Mitgliedstaaten“ lehnen es ab, den Zugriff auf Daten von Personen, die weder angeklagt noch verdächtig sind, zu beschränken.

Noch nicht mal die geforderten Ausnahmen für Berufsgeheimnisträger erkennen die Ministerien an. Eine solche Einschränkung wäre „aus praktischer Sicht nicht durchführbar“, heißt es lapidar.

Massenabfragen: Bestandsdaten und Funkzellen

Diese Haltung zieht sich durch das gesamte Dokument. Der EuGH bezeichnet es als „unabdingbar“, dass Vorratsdaten nur nach richterlicher Anordnung herausgegeben werden dürfen. Aber die Ministerien „gehen davon aus“, dass das nicht für Bestandsdaten gilt.

Nur in Deutschland und nur für Telefon-Daten gab es letztes Jahr zwölf Millionen solcher Anfragen – ganz ohne Richterbeschluss. Statistiken zu Internet-Daten gibt es nicht, die dürften noch höher sein.

Laut EuGH ist es „wichtig“ und „erforderlich“, Personen darüber zu informieren, wenn Behörden auf ihre Daten zugegriffen haben. Denn nur, wenn man von Grundrechtseingriffen erfährt, kann man sich auch dagegen wehren. Diese klaren Worte ignorieren die Ministerien und erörtern „die Notwendigkeit“, ob man denn „betroffene Personen über den Zugriff auf ihre Daten informieren“ muss.

Hier wiederholt sich der Prozess von der Funkzellenabfrage: Das Gesetz schreibt eindeutig vor, dass Betroffene informiert werden müssen. Trotzdem konstruieren politisch Verantwortliche immer wieder neue Ausreden, diese Anforderungen zu umgehen.

Erneuerbare Speicheranordnung „nicht angemessen“

Immerhin eine Idee scheint vom Tisch: das Konzept der „erneuerbaren Speicheranordnungen“. Die Idee war, Kommunikationsanbieter nicht pauschal, sondern immer wieder neu zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung zu verpflichten. Die meisten Mitgliedstaaten haben jedoch eine „zurückhaltende Reaktion“ dazu, also „erscheint eine weitere Auslotung nicht sinnvoll“.

Keine große Diskussion gab es über die Speicherdauer, die europaweit „von einigen Wochen bis zu drei Jahren“ liegt, sowie über eine Pseudonymisierung oder Verschlüsselung der gespeicherten Daten – das scheint „ein weniger kritisches Thema zu sein“.

Insgesamt zeigt das Papier deutlich, dass eine flächendeckende und anlasslose Vorratsdatenspeicherung mit den höchstrichterlichen Vorgaben schlicht unvereinbar ist. Dass die Innenministerien trotzdem weiter am toten Pferd VDS festhalten, ist so grundrechtsfeindlich wie erwartbar. Dass die Justizministerien der EU-Länder dabei mitmachen, steht im direkten Widerspruch zu ihrer Aufgabe im Rechtsstaat – der Achtung von Recht und Gewaltenteilung.

Während die Vorratsdatenspeicherung in Europa gekippt ist, bleibt die zweite Vorratsdatenspeicherung in Deutschland in Kraft, wird aber von Kommunikations-Anbietern aktuell nicht umgesetzt. Den Wissenschaftlichen Diensten des Bundestages zufolge ist das deutsche Gesetz nicht mit europäischem Recht vereinbar. Derzeit wird es sowohl vom Bundesverfassungsgericht als auch vom Europäischen Gerichtshof geprüft.


Hier das Dokument aus dem PDF befreit:

Council of the European Union

  • Date: Brussels, 23 November 2018
  • Document number: 14319/18
  • Classification: Limite
  • From: Presidency
  • To: Committee of Permanent Representatives / Council
  • Number of previous document: 13826/18

Data retention – State of Play

I. Introduction

A common reflection process on data retention for the purposes of prevention and prosecution of crime in the light of ECJ judgements in the Digital Rights Ireland and Tele 2 cases was launched under the MT Presidency and was continued by the EE and the BG Presidencies.

The December 2017 Justice and Home Affairs Council decided to focus on three main elements for the future work: ensuring availability of data (coherence with the draft e-Privacy Regulation); setting access safeguards; and restricting the scope of the data retention framework in view of the recent jurisprudence.

As far as coherence with the draft e-Privacy Regulation is concerned, the reform of the e-Privacy framework is relevant in the context of the data retention debate. To this end, DAPIX FoP Data retention held joint sessions with the Working Party TELECOM on 12 February and 17 May 2018. In this regard, the need to maintain flexibility within the new e-Privacy Regulation has been recognised as a crucial element in order to allow future developments either through the case-law of the ECJ, or through legislative reforms at national or European level.

To further substantiate the concept of restricted data retention (first level of interference) certain issues such as limiting the data categories, limiting the data retention periods, storage in the territory of the Union and storage in an encrypted fashion/pseudonymisation were specified in the report to the Council for further exploration. Concerning the concept of targeted access to retained data (second level of interference), various suggestions for substantive and procedural legal requirements were made. As a preliminary observation, it is the common understanding of the Member States that the findings of the ECJ in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele 2 do not apply to subscriber data, but only to traffic and location data.

The BG Presidency started discussions in the DAPIX FoP Data retention working group on interference level 1 (restricted data retention). On 18 April Europol reported on the findings from the data matrix workshop and delegations discussed the possible follow-up. They also explored the concept of renewable retention warrants. On 17 May discussions on the data retentions periods were started, which were continued under the AT Presidency on 10 July. With this, the examination of the elements on interference level 1 were completed. On 11 September, the working group examined the substantive and procedural legal requirements which completed the discussions on interference level 2 (targeted access to retained data).

In this document, the AT Presidency provides a state of play of the discussions in DAPIX FoP Data retention, including the written contributions, on interference levels 1 and 2, alongside the most relevant passages from the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele 2. On 21 November, CATS examined this state of play with a view to preparing discussions in the Committee of Permanent Representatives on 28 November and the JHA Council on 6/7 December.

II. Level 1 interference: restricted data retention

In Tele 2 the ECJ states:

(…) Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article

52(1) of the Charter, does not prevent a Member State from adopting legislation permitting, as a preventive measure, the targeted retention of traffic and location data, for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that the retention of data is limited, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted, to what is strictly necessary.

The following paragraphs look at different options for restricted data retention (interference level 1):

1. Limiting data categories – works on a „data matrix“ coordinated by Europol

The concept of limiting data categories seeks to explore whether data, which is not strictly or objectively necessary for the purposes of the prevention and prosecution of crime and safeguarding public security, can a priori be excluded from a data retention framework. As a means to limit data categories, works on a „data matrix“ was undertaken. To this end, Europol was encouraged by the Council to facilitate preparatory works for such a data matrix at technical level in close cooperation with experts from the Member States, with a view to further examination in DAPIXFoP. Two workshops with national cybercrime experts and investigators took place at Europol headquarters in The Hague, in March and May 2018.

An important finding of the workshops was that the relevant ETSI-standards, which serve as a basis for the discussions, have already „filtered“ the data sets that are technically available. This means that data categories, which are not deemed necessary for the investigation and prosecution of crime, have already been excluded from the list beforehand. As a result, the experts considered that only very few additional data categories could be excluded from the list as not being necessary for the investigation and prosecution of crime. This is also due to the fact that different crime investigations and investigative techniques require different data categories to be used across Member States. These findings, among others, were summed up by Europol in two documents and presented to the DAPIX FoP Data retention group.

Therefore, as far as the issue of limiting data categories is concerned, it can be concluded that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to further exclude a significant number of data categories from storage in advance. The reason for this is that the relevant ETSI standards have already „filtered“ the broader data sets that are technically available, because they have been specifically developed for law enforcement purposes. A further reduction of categories of retained data would therefore be detrimental to the effectiveness of law enforcement investigations. Furthermore, different crime investigations and investigative techniques in the Member States require different data categories. As those data categories which are not necessary for law enforcement purposes are already excluded, there is no general and indiscriminate retention of data as referred to in the Tele 2 judgment of the ECJ.

2. Renewable retention warrants (RRW)

In working paper WK 3974/2018 INIT the BG Presidency presented the concept of renewable retention warrants (RRW). Although the ECJ had not raised this issue in its rulings, it was considered worthwhile to explore this concept. For the purpose of the discussion a RRW was defined as a

warrant issued by a competent national authority addressed to (an) electronic service provider(s) (ESPs) operating in the territory of a Member State requesting the provider to retain (certain categories of) data which is valid for a specific period of time during which it can be renewed if it fulfils the specific conditions prescribed by national law for its renewal, including that its proportionality and necessity are justified by a prior and confirmed by a subsequent threat assessment.

Hence, a RRW would limit the amount of data retained because of its fixed period of validity, its limitation to certain ESPs (e.g. by not including minor ESPs) and/or the possibility to limit the scope of the RRW to certain data categories only. Moreover, the requirement for the RRW to be authorised by a member of the judiciary, the need for renewal of the RRW after the expiry of the validity period and/or other procedural safeguards would ensure a regular review of the measure.

However, in the discussion in the DAPIX FoP Data retention meeting on 18 April 2018, the vast majority of Member States expressed reluctance about accepting the idea of RRWs to limit the amount of data retained. Only one Member State, which uses a similar system, expressed support for the idea. The main arguments of the Member States opposing the RRWs were that in their national contexts the approach would be too complex and inefficient and that it would not at all fit into their national criminal law systems, in particular their laws on criminal procedure.

Given the reluctant view of most Member States towards RRWs and the fact that the concept was not brought up by the ECJ anyway, further exploration does not seem appropriate.

3. Limited storage periods

3.1 Length of the retention period

At the meeting on 17 May 2018, the BG Presidency asked delegations to give information about the length of the retention periods in their Member States. While the periods ranged from a few weeks to three years, in the majority of Member States (where there is a data retention regime in place) the retention period is either six or 12 months.

At the meeting on 10 July 2018, the AT Presidency asked those Member States where the national data retention regime had been challenged before the Constitutional Court or another court of last instance to give information about the rulings with special regard to the retention periods. It was found that in all but one Member State that commented on this issue, and irrespective of whether the data retention regime was upheld or declared invalid by the relevant national court, the length of the retention periods was not a central issue in the courts’ considerations or even an issue at all. Only in one Member State, following the proceedings before the national Constitutional Court, was the retention period reduced from 12 to six months, while in another Member State the retention period was reduced following a suggestion by its national constitutional committee.

The considerations of the ECJ in Tele 2 concerning the length of the retention periods are limited to the statement that the retention period adopted has to be limited to what is strictly necessary. Several Member States emphasised that in their view a retention period of at least 12 months would be absolutely necessary for the purpose of effective law enforcement.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the length of the retention period seems to be a less critical issue in the context of the jurisprudence of the ECJ, although it is of key importance that data are available for law enforcement purposes for an appropriate period of time.

3.2. Differentiation between data categories on retention level

At the meeting on 10 July 2018, the AT Presidency asked delegations whether in their national system different retention periods would apply to different data categories. In response, the majority of Member States indicated that they did not differentiate between different data categories at the retention level, while only a few Member States answered that their national legislation provided for a differentiation, or would provide for a differentiation in the future. The ECJ does not provide an explicit statement about different retention periods for different kinds of data categories, but only mentions the possibility to differentiate between different categories of data10. It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that the differentiation has to relate to a different lengths of time periods for different data categories.

Another option than differentiating between data categories at the retention level would be to have different periods at the access level (see below).

3.3. Erasure of data at the end of the retention period

In Digital Rights Ireland the ECJ criticizes that „Directive 2006/24 [data retention directive, declared invalid with Digital Rights Ireland judgement] does not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period.“ Therefore, a concrete rule on the erasure of data at the end of the retention period seems to be necessary in a data retention regime.

At the meeting on 10 July 2018 all Member States participating in the discussion outlined that they do have specific rules for the erasure (or in some case pseudonymisation) of data at the end of the retention period. In addition, a number of Member States reported that storage of the data after the expiry of the obligatory retention period in their national legislation is lawful if it is necessary for the providers’ business purposes. Law enforcement authorities can access such data as long as the respective rules of criminal procedure are complied with.

4. Requirements for data security – storage in the territory of the Union and storage in encrypted fashion/pseudonymisation

4.1. Data storage in the territory of the European Union

In Tele 2 the ECJ states that

[g]iven the quantity of retained data, the sensitivity of that data and the risk of unlawful access to it, the providers of electronic communications services must, in order to ensure the full integrity and confidentiality of that data, guarantee a particularly high level of protection and security by means of appropriate technical and organisational measures. In particular, the national legislation must make provision for the data to be retained within the European Union and for the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period.

At the meeting on 10 July 2018 (Working paper WK 7875/2018 INIT) the AT Presidency asked the Member States whether their national data retention systems provided for mandatory data storage in the territory of the European Union. Of those Member States who contributed to the discussion, a slight majority of delegations reported that storage within the EU (or EEA in one case) was compulsory. In half of these cases, data even has to be stored within the Member State itself. Among the Member States without a legal obligation to store data within the EU, some expressed their concerns about such an obligation, as it might lead to a different treatment of domestic and foreign providers.

Hence, Member States‘ positions and national data retention systems concerning the mandatory storage of retained data within the EU vary.

4.2. Data storage in encrypted fashion/pseudonymisation

The suggestion to store retained data in encrypted fashion or to protect them through pseudonymisation does not stem from Digital Rights Ireland or Tele 2 directly, but was one of the suggestions for discussion put forward by the EE Presidency, to fulfil the ECJ’s requirement to provide minimum security safeguards.

In the discussions on 10 July 2018 only a very small number of Member States stated that they had experience with data security measures such as storage in an encrypted fashion or pseudonymisation. The majority of Member States contributing to the discussion explained that their national legislation did not provide for detailed or descriptive security measures. Some of them added they had a critical view of such measures, while others mentioned that they had already evaluated measures such as encryption or pseudonymisation of stored data or were currently in the process of evaluation.

Furthermore, when answering a more general question about technical measures to protect data, most Member States stated that their national laws on data retention did not contain specific rules about the safe storage of data, but that general rules were applied; some Member States leave it to the discretion of providers to put adequate data security measures in place. Only a small number of Member States indicated that there are specific requirements in their laws and/or technical regulations concerning the safe storage of data in their national data retention system.

The issue of data security is, in general, a current and important topic for Member States. At the same time, taking into consideration the view of many Member States and the fact that the ECJ does not explicitly mention data storage in an encrypted fashion or pseudonymisation as specific requirement, data storage in encrypted fashion/pseudonymisation does not seem to be an issue of first priority when exploring specific requirements for a data retention regime.

4.3. Review of safeguards against misuse of the data by an independent authority

The need for review of compliance with data protection safeguards by an independent authority is explicitly mentioned by the ECJ in Tele 2.

In the discussion on 10 July 2018 all participating Member States stated that a national authority had the power to review the safeguards of the providers in relation to data retention. Some Member States explicitly supported the statement that such a review of safeguards by an independent authority could be used as an argument to defend national legislation on data retention. A data retention regime in accordance with Union law should therefore contain a provision for review of compliance with safeguards by a national independent authority.

III. Level II Interference: Access Level

In Digital Rights Ireland, the ECJ states as follows:

(…) not only is there a general absence of limits in Directive 2006/24 but Directive 2006/24 also fails to lay down any objective criterion by which to determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the extent and seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, may be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such an interference. On the contrary, Directive 2006/24 simply refers, in Article 1(1), in a general manner to serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law.

However, specific answers to the question whether any distinction has to be made between the different categories of data were not given by the ECJ.

1. Differentiation between data categories at access level

Opinions about the technical feasibility of differentiation at the access level and its value to fulfil the requirements of the ECJ for a data retention regime were manifold. Some Member States were in favour of different access periods and deemed them to be technically feasible, while other Member States opposed this idea for a variety of reasons. In particular, making a distinction between the different categories at the access level was considered to be too costly and technically complex.

2. Substantive legal requirements for access to retained data

The discussion looked at different aspects, elements and options concerning the substantive legal requirements for access to and use of retained data. One of the main issues raised by the ECJ in the Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 judgements was the lack of objective rules and criteria, determining the crimes in respect of which data can be accessed and subsequently used for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of crimes.

In the course of the general discussion, Member States clearly emphasised the distinction between crime types, as well as their seriousness, as major aspects.

2.1. Serious Crime / Organised Crime / Terrorism

In Digital Rights Ireland, the ECJ states that the fight against „serious crime“ is an objective of general interest, which would, in theory, be able to justify data retention measures. However, the objective general interest of fighting serious crime alone cannot justify a general and indiscriminate data retention regime, especially if the Directive only refers to the indefinite term of „serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law“.

In Tele 2, the ECJ refers to this reasoning and goes one step further stating that only the fight against serious crime can justify a measure like the contested national data retention regimes.

Regarding organised crime and terrorism, the contributing Member States stated that these crime types are considered unambiguously (but not exclusively) serious and that therefore access to retained data is considered necessary.

In addition, the discussion amongst Member States showed that Member States have specific legislation in place in their national laws determining the substantive conditions under which access to retained data is possible. For instance, some Member States have laid down a catalogue of crimes allowing access to retained data, while others define the threshold by a certain minimum punishment or require that pre-trial detention may be imposed for the respective crime. So, while Member States agreed that access to retained data should not only be possible in cases of organised crime and terrorism, but also for the investigation and prosecution of all other forms of serious crime, Member States must be competent for defining what constitutes a serious crime.

In addition, several Member States put emphasis on the fact that the decision on whether access to retained data is granted has to be examined by a judicial or administrative independent authority on a case-by-case basis, taking into account considerations of proportionality and necessity in every individual case. Therefore, Member States need to have discretion when defining in their respective national (criminal) laws which crimes are to be considered „serious crimes“ that justify access to retained data.

2.2 Cybercrime and (other) crimes committed online

The positions expressed by the Member States were manifold. Some Member States explicitly cover cybercrime as a crime type which allows access to retained data, while others differentiate between serious and non-serious offences. Three further issues were brought up by some Member States: the general public considers some crimes committed online (e.g. online stalking, online harassment, online fraud) as presenting a severe danger due to the harm they cause regardless of the fact that these crimes do not necessarily fit into the pattern of „serious crime“ due to their low maximum sentence. In addition, some forms of cybercrime (e.g. cyberattacks on critical infrastructure) pose severe threats to society as a whole. Member States also pointed to the fact that without access to retained data, criminal investigations in cybercrime cases would – more often than in other criminal cases – turn out to be futile because digital evidence would be unavailable.

2.3 „Search & Rescue“

Access to retained data for the purpose of searching for missing or abducted persons has not been specifically addressed in the ECJ rulings. Discussion amongst the Member States lead to the conclusion that often such cases do not fall within the scope of criminal proceedings but within other (public security) duties of the police or are conducted by other competent authorities (e.g. intelligence services). Hence, access to retained data in such cases was deemed to be outside the scope of the ECJ rulings.

3. Procedural legal requirements for access to retained data

The ECJ criticised in both rulings, Digital Rights Ireland and Tele 2, the lack of rules regulating the procedural criteria under which retained traffic and location data can be accessed.

The legal requirement set out by the ECJ was a call for the Member States to „lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of such a data retention measure and imposing minimum safeguards“ in order to give „sufficient guarantees of the effective protection […] against the risk of misuse.“

3.1 Review by a judicial or by an independent administrative authority including emergency cases

According to the ECJ, „[…] it is essential that access of the competent national authorities to retained data should [ …] be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body, and that the decision […] should be made following a reasoned request […].“

Hence, one safeguard emphasised by the ECJ is the prior review carried out by a judicial or an independent administrative authority.

The vast majority of the Member States described their judicial review regimes as in line with the prerequisites set out by the ECJ, through a prior review by a court/judge, an independent administrative authority or the prosecution office. Special conditions apply for emergency cases, where the legal framework can provide for exceptions to the general rule of prior review, e.g. by providing for a notification system or an ex post approval in emergency cases. Only one Member State applies a general ex post review by a court.

During the discussions, many Member States highlighted a distinction between the different data categories when it comes to prior review regimes. Subscriber data is considered not to be subject to prior review mechanisms, whereas access to retained traffic and location data in the context of criminal investigations are commonly considered to require a prior review by a court/judge or independent administrative authority, except in validly established cases of urgency. This correlates with the fact that the scope of the ECJ’s judgements in Digital Rights Ireland as well as Tele 2, only extends to traffic and location data and does not cover subscriber data (see also the Introduction above).

3.2 Installation of a legal protection commissioner

It was further explored whether an independent legal protection commissioner could be appointed as an additional safeguard for the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights.

However, during the discussion, Member States clearly stated their reluctance to introduce such an additional body. In all, the usual review mechanisms in criminal proceedings on an administrative level or on a judicial level by the public prosecutor, the investigative judge or during the trial by the trial judge were deemed to be sufficiently guaranteeing the protection of individuals’ (fundamental) rights.

3.3 Special rules for access to retained data of certain groups of persons
3.3.1 Exemptions for persons subject to professional secrecy

In Digital Rights Ireland, the ECJ stated that „[..Directive 2006/24..] does not provide for any exception, with the result that it applies even to persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national law, to the obligation of professional secrecy.“

Lawyers, doctors, journalists, members of the judiciary and members of parliament were mentioned exemplarily as possible individuals subject to professional secrecy or privilege. In the discussion on 11 September 2018, the questions of whether there should be exemptions to these individuals and, if so, how to define these exemptions were explored.

Several Member States do have exemptions for persons subject to professional secrecy, and some stated that they considered such exemptions to be in line with the settled ECJ case law, even though their respective legal regimes did not yet provide for such exemptions. One Member State mentioned that there are additional safeguards for certain groups of people, requiring particular care and additional considerations in light of those groups’ obligation of professional secrecy.

However, some Member States raised concerns that such restriction would not be feasible from a practical perspective, as the fact that a certain person is a member of a certain group of professionals would often not be known at the point in time when access to retained data was obtained, especially at the beginning of an investigation. If the person’s identity was revealed only at a later stage of the proceedings, the accessed data could be considered unlawfully obtained evidence and would be eliminated from the file. Furthermore, concerns were raised that such exemptions for certain groups of professionals would run counter to the objectives of efficient criminal prosecution as these persons could be the subject of an investigation too.

3.3.2 Access to data of persons who are not suspects or accused persons

In order to investigate and prosecute crime, there might not only be a need to access retained data of suspects or accused persons, but also to access retained data of victims, witnesses or persons remotely connected to a crime.

The ECJ states in this context, that it sees the necessity of a threshold as follows: „[I]n particular situations, where for example vital national security, defence or public security interests are threatened by terrorist activities, access to the data of other persons might also be granted where there is objective evidence from which it can be deduced that that data might, in a specific case, make an effective contribution to combating such activities.“

Member States were invited to discuss possibilities to access retained data of persons who are not suspects or accused persons.

The main concerns raised by several Member States related to the fact that often proceedings are commenced not against certain individuals, but against (at least in the beginning) unknown perpetrators. Therefore, an ex ante exclusion of individuals subject to data access would hinder or even harm effective investigation.

Hence, most Member States are not in favour of limitations with regard to accessing data of persons other than suspects or accused persons as long as there is a connection to the investigations/criminal proceedings.

3.4 Notifications of the persons affected and legal remedies

The AT Presidency also invited the Member States to discuss the necessity of notifying persons affected by access to their retained data as well as to the requirements of an ex-post review of the decision authorising the access.

In Tele 2, the ECJ states that it is necessary to install rules for a notification as well as to pave the way for a judicial review as follows: „That notification is, in fact, necessary to enable the persons affected to exercise, inter alia, their right to a legal remedy.“

As a preliminary issue, the question of a definition of „affected persons“ was raised and lead to various answers. Accused persons or suspects were unanimously considered to fit in this category. According to some Member States, persons connected to the suspect/accused or all persons who participated in the communication concerned by the relevant traffic data might fall within the category as well. Other Member States draw the line between victims, witnesses, suspects/accused persons, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, third parties who despite the fact that they might appear in some investigatory measure, nonetheless do not fall within the scope of the term „affected“ (e.g. cell phone tower inquiries).

In a second step, the AT Presidency invited Member States to discuss the necessity of notifying affected persons that their data have been accessed. Discussions showed a wide range of options: several Member States (only) notify the suspect or the accused person, some apply a more general approach, others consider this an issue of the parties’ right to access the criminal file and still others do not actively notify persons of access to retained data. Furthermore, several Member States stated the need for exceptions to notification obligations, e.g. when the identity of a person whose data is concerned cannot be determined without further investigations or for cases when the notification of the affected person is detrimental to ongoing investigations. Also, it was argued that in the latter case it should be possible to postpone notifications to a later date.

Regarding the right to a legal remedy, only a few Member States already grant a remedy during preliminary proceedings; most Member States give appeal rights to accused persons only during the trial phase. A few Member States additionally grant affected persons under certain conditions a right to request information on whether they have been affected by access to retained data during criminal proceedings or not and if so, additional legal remedies against such access. One Member State mentioned that individuals (not limited to affected persons) may bring a claim for legal remedy whether or not they have been notified, if they have reasonable cause.

IV. Conclusion

The Presidency invites the Committee of Permanent Representatives and Council to take note of the State of play of the discussions in the DAPIX FoP Data retention working group set out above and to share ideas about the way forward.

14 Kommentare
  1. Was ich dabei nicht verstehe:
    Jeder Provider speichert die Telekommunikationsdaten bis zur Abrechnung und dem Ablauf einer angemessenen Widerspruchsfrist. Damit gibt es doch schon die allumfassende „Vorratsdatenspeicherung“. Die ist legal, weil vertraglich mit dem Telefonkunden vereinbart. Darauf kann der Staat im Ermittlungsverfahren Zugriff nehmen.

    Was soll denn darüberhinaus von der Rechtsprechung untersagt worden sein?
    Welchen weitergehenden Speicherungsbedarf könnte es noch darüber hinaus überhaupt noch geben?

    1. Im Grundsatz hast du Recht. Aber der Staat will sich nicht mit freiwilliger Speicherung zufrieden geben, sondern eine Speicherpflicht.

      Es gibt aber tatsächlich Unterschiede, etwa bei Speicherdauer und Datentypen – oder auch bei Kommunikationsarten. Prepaid-SIM-Karten brauchen beispielsweise keine Rechnung. Und Standortdaten braucht’s dafür auch nicht.

      1. Vorweg,
        ich möchte auch das Verbrechen in den Knast wandern, auch wenn es komisch klingt, ich möchte nicht das eine vorläufige „Schuldvermutung“ einem das restliche Leben verhagelt, weil man in den Knast wandert, da man seine Unschuld nicht zeitnah nachweisen kann und der Ankläger lediglich mit nicht nachgewiesenen Behauptungen aufwartet!

        Unsere Politiker begründen solche Maßnahmen stets mit dem „internationalen Terrorismus“.
        Dabei terrrorisieren eben diese Politiker uns EU-Bürger tagtäglich mit ihren Forderungen nach mehr Überwachung!
        Selbst die NSA ist schon ein Jahr mit der Auswertung der Daten im „Hintertreffen“!
        Was im Umkehrschluss bedeutet, das jede Terrororganisation ca 12 Monate Zeit hat, um einen Anschlag zu planen und durchzuführen.

        Ich denke mal, das es unseren Politikern mehr um Schnüffelei bei unliebsamen Andersdenkenden aus der Opposition oder Abweichler in den eigenen Parteien geht!

        Letzteres macht politisch den meisten Sinn!

      2. Sag mal, so eine freiwillige Speicherung, ist die dann nicht automatisch mit illegal (zumindest, wenn sie nicht zur Vertragserfüllung gebraucht werden, also bei einer Flatrate mindestens mal alle Verbindungsdaten)? Nach meinem Verständnis sollte man, wenn man nicht dazu gezwungen werden kann bestimmte Daten zu speichern, diese auch nicht freiwillig speichern dürfen. Zumindest in diesem Fall sollte genau die gleiche Argumentation des EuGH auch ziehen.

  2. Grundsätzlich sind doch die Ziele der Strafverfolgung eine rechtsstaatliche Notwendigkeit. Die Ermittlung von Personen, die sich zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt in einer Funkzelle aufgehalten haben und die Tatsache, dass A mit B zu einem bestimmten Termin miteinander Kontakt hatten sind deshalb doch durchaus Daten, die zur Sachverhaltsaufklärung sachdienlich sind. Eine rechtliche Relevanz kriegen sie erst durch weitere Informationen, die auf ein deliktisches Handeln schliessen lassen. Wenn man dann noch zur Kenntnis nimmt, dass eine Grossteil von Kriminaltität internetbasierte ist, sollte es doch grundsätzlich keine Einwände gegen die befristete Datenspeicherung geben.

    Schranken müssen m.E. Erst in auf der nachfolgenden Ebene eingezogen werden: WEr hat Zugang unter welchen Voraussetzungen, wer überwacht die Rechtsmässigkeit dieses Zugangs und welche Schutzmechanismen stehen dem Betroffenen zu.

    Ich räume ein, dass sich unser Strafrecht zunehmend weg entwickelt von der Pflicht, dem die Täter die Tat nachzuweisen hin zu der Notwendigkeit, sich zu entlasten. M.E liegt aber genau hier das Problem. Anstatt wegen einer Vielzahl von Indizien den Entlastungsbeweis zu fordern, müsste den Strafverfolgungsbehörden wieder die volle Beweislast auferlegt werden.

    1. Du hast also keine Einwände, dass 500 Millionen EU-Bürger unter permanenten Generalverdacht gestellt werden, sie könnten ein Verbrechen begehen. Nur gut, dass die obersten EU-Richter das anders sehen. Rechtsstaatlich ist die Unschuldsvermutung. Rechtsstaatlich ist es, ein höchstrichterliches Urteil zu respektieren und nicht es mit aller Macht unterlaufen zu versuchen. Rechtsstaatlich ist, die Grundrechte, Bürgerrechte und Allgemeinen Menschenrechte zu achten und zu bewahren, und nicht sie mit den selben Märchen immer mehr zu missachten und beschneiden. 2017 war die Zahl der weltweiten Terroropfer so niedrig, wie schon lange nicht mehr. Im Vergleich zu den Zeitraum von Terroropfern in den 1970ern und 1980ern bewegen wir uns trotz der ganzen großen tragischen terroristischen Verbrechen der letzten 25 Jahre im Bereich der 10 Prozent von damals. Wir leben in einer Angstgesellschaft, Angst vor dem eigenen Schatten. Und die Politik, die Polizeibehörden und Geheimdienste nutzen diese Angst für ihre jeweiligen Interessen aus und schüren diese Ängste nach besten Kräften mit den verschiedensten Märchen. Und die breite Masse blökt nur wie eine Herde Schafe.

    2. @HerBert, klar macht eine generelle Schuldvermutung für Politik und Behörden einen Sinn!
      Für einen Unschuldigen macht es keinen Sinn, seine Unschuld nachweisen zu müssen!
      Zumal Identitätsfälschungen gerne auch mal von genannten Behörden genutzt werden, um verdeckte Ermittler mit diesen zu versorgen!

      Standhafte „Legenden“ zu generieren ist nicht leicht, da auch die V-Organisationen wissen, welche Prüfkriterien sie „Abchecken“ müssen https://mobil.n-tv.de/panorama/Beamte-im-Visier-der-Anti-Mafia-Ermittlungen-article20758800.html
      Was nehmen?
      Nun, sie nehmen sehr realitätsnahe Identitäten, die ermittelnde Behörden, die nicht in die verdeckten Operationen involviert wurden.
      Klar ist bei diesem Szenario, das dem Verdeckten Ermittler in diesem Falle nix passiert, wohl aber demjenigen, dem die echte Identität gehört!
      Man muss hier auch mal Klar feststellen, das solche Behörden nicht gern Fehler zugeben und eine monatelange Ermittlung für einen entbehrlichen Zivilisten gefährden?

      Diese Antwort dürfen Sie sich gerne selbst geben!

      Auch sollten Sie sich selber die Frage stellen, was wäre wenn Sie ein solches Opfer für die Gesellschaft bringen müssten, würden Sie es mit patriotischer Freude tun oder eher stink Sauer wegen ihrer rechtlichen Ohnmacht sein?

      Klar können auch Cyberterroristen ihre Identität stehlen und klar würde die ermittelnde Behörde, ohne viel Widerspruch, Sie einlochen!

      Konsequenzen?
      Sie sollten mal über die Konsequenzen nachdenken, auch wenn Sie unter „Protektion“ stehen sollten, was ist, würde sich das ändern?
      Ja, dann könnte es auch Sie und ihre Familie treffen!
      Seien wir doch mal ehrlich, einem Kollegen ans falsche Bein gepinkelt und der lässt in einem cholerischen ( https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choleriker ) Anfall mal seine Beziehungsdrähte klingeln, was machen Sie dann?
      Dumm gelaufen, wenn gegen Sie in der oben genannten rechtlichen Konstellation ermittelt wird, nicht?
      ———-
      „Wovor haben Sie Angst? Sie haben doch nichts zu verbergen, oder?“

    3. Selbstverständlich sind alle über eine Person und ihren Kontext verfügbaren Daten zur Ermittlung von was auch immer sachdienliche Informationen.
      Es ist ausreichend geklärt, was eine permanente, oder eine permanent mögliche, Überwachung mit sozialen Gesellschaften macht.
      Es ist ausreichend geklärt, was die Möglichkeit einer unabweichlichen Rechtsdurchsetzung aus der Erkenntnis macht, Recht stellt immer nur ein Abbild der jeweils vorhandenen Machtverhältnisse innerhalb einer Gesellschaft und der in ihr durchgesetzten moralischen Vorstellungen dar.

      Falls man davon ausgeht, das ein totalitäres, tyrannisches Recht gesteuertes System voller sich konform gebender Untertanen und einer sich bildenden zentralen Führung die Ultima Ratio für die Lösung aller Probleme ist, dann erscheint es sicher erstrebenswert diese Daten in großer Dichte und Breite vorzuhalten.

      1. Erschreckend finde ich den Verlauf dieser Diskussion. Ich habe die Frage aufgeworfen, ob wir in einer digitalen Gesellschaft der Polizei nicht auch grundsätzlich digitale Ermittlungsmethoden einräumen müssen und DAFÜR am anderen Ende die Kompentenzen der Polizei BESCHRÄNKEN und ÜBERWACHEN müssen. (Eingriffsvoraussetzung, -tiefe,Kontrollinstanz, Rechtsmittel)

        Darauf ist nicht ein Einziger von Euch eingegangen.
        Statt dessen unsinnige Behauptung wie „generelle Schuldvermutung“ oder abwegige Unterstellungen wie „Angstgesellschaft“ totalitäres, tyrananisches Recht, Untertanenverhalten…. Das sind Narrative aber keine Argumente. Dass ich keineswegs einer allmächtigen Polizei das Wort geredet habe, hat offensichtlich keiner von Euch begriffen? Hat es unsere Gesellschaft tatsächlich verlernt, bis zu Ende zuzuhören, sachlich zu argumentieren, das Argument des einen aufzugreifen, es ggf. zu widerlegen und daraus eine Conclusio abzuleiten?

        Und immer wieder diese grenzenlose Verachtung gegen den Staat und seine Organe. Sicher, Skepsis ist immer angesagt, aber ohne Vertrauen gibt es keine Demokratie und keinen REchtsstaat. Ich plädiere für ein ausgewogenes System von Checks und Ballances und spreche gegen radikale, einseitige und unverhältnismäßige Entwicklungen.

        1. @HerBert,

          die Grundlage meiner Äußerung sind die aktuellen Gesetze und Befugnisse der Polizei, die perwerserweise auch im Internet gelten!
          Was unsere Politiker und Vertreter der Polizei des öfteren zu Negieren versuchen!
          Ferner haben die Gerichte auch gegen diese aggressiven „Befugniserlangungsversuche“ der Politik und Polizei, eindeutige Urteile gesprochen, die wiederum missachtet werden sollen!

          Die Befugnisse unserer Polizeien sind ausreichend, diese müssten lediglich EU-Weit quasi „Homogenisiert“ werden, damit auch ein französischer Polizist sich mit seinem Anliegen, z.B. einem im „Internet“ begangenem Delikt, bei deutschen Behörden Gehör „verschaffen“ darf!
          Mangelnde Kommunikation und Kompetenzgerangel sind hier das wirkliche Problem, nicht das fehlen von „Vorratsdaten“!

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