Interview: US-Behörde wollte illegal an Nutzerdaten von indymedia.us gelangen

Ich hatte soeben die Möglichkeit, ein Interview mit der Indymedia-Administratorin zu führen, die auf illegitime Weise von US-Behörden zur Herausgabe von Nutzerdaten gebracht werden sollte. Das Interview ist als Ergänzung zu dem ausführlichen Bericht der EFF über den Fall zu verstehen.

netzpolitik.org: The EFF writes that you were actually in contact with them before you got that subpoena. Did you expect to receive bogus subpoenas?
Kristina Clair: No, I didn’t expect to receive a bogus subpoena, but I knew I would need legal consultation. An Indymedia list suggested the EFF. I received an email stating that I would be receiving the subpoena, which is how I knew I would be receiving it before I received it.
netzpolitik.org: So it is not common that authorities try to get information they are not entitled to receive?
Kristina Clair: Well, I don’t really know how common it is.
netzpolitik.org: Do you know about other cases in which Indymedia was asked to disclose such an amount of user data?
Kristina Clair: Nope. I haven’t heard of an indymedia server being subpoenaed in a while. but that doesn’t mean it hasn’t happened.
netzpolitik.org: Does Indymedia actually store the data they requested?
Kristina Clair: No, it is standard Indymedia policy not to log IP addresses. Also, by the time they asked for the logs in question, those logs had long been discarded as per log rotation policy.
netzpolitik.org: So why didn’t you just tell them that you did not have what they wanted?
Kristina Clair: Because I did not want to engage with them directly. The EFF confirmed that this was a good policy in our first conversation – that they (the EFF) would communicate with the issuer of the subpoena. I didn’t really expect that all this other stuff would come out, that they weren’t authorized to ask for the info that they asked for, etc.
netzpolitik.org: You were also asked to keep quiet about the subpoena…
Kristina Clair: Yes, the subpoena stated that I was not to discuss it with anyone.
netzpolitik.org: Would you have complied to this if it had been legal?
Kristina Clair: Yes, I complied to it until it was repealed. I would have continued to if it had not been repealed – I’m not really interested in getting myself into any unnecessary legal trouble!
netzpolitik.org: So putting information about it on Wikileaks or something like this would not have been an option for you?
Kristina Clair: I don’t think I would have done that, no.
netzpolitik.org: The EFF alleges that such bogus gag orders are frequently used to keep illegitimate surveillance out of the public’s eye. Do you think that’s how it works?
Kristina Clair: I think that sounds plausible.
netzpolitik.org: Thank you for answering my questions.
Kristina Clair: Yes, thanks for covering it on the blog.

Ich denke, an Kristinas Antworten wird deutlich, dass man davon ausgehen muss, dass staatlichen Stellen (sicher nicht nur in den USA) durch Einschüchterung ohne rechtliche Grundlage an Informationen kommen. Gerade vor dem Hintergrund vieler beschränkt zugänglicher Datensammlungen wie der Vorratsdatenspeicherung ist es wichtig, das zu bedenken.

Immer wieder werden wird die Einführung von Datensammlungen und Einrichtung von Überwachungsinfrastruktur damit begründet, dass nur eingeschränkt darauf zugegriffen werden kann. Teilweise rücken Politiker selbst schnell mit zusätzlichen Forderungen an. Es reicht aber schon, wie sich hier zeigt, ein begieriger Staatsanwalt. Wirklicher Schutz von Daten ist nur durch Vermeidung ihres Aufkommens möglich.